It was a “grave diplomatic mistake.”
These forceful words seem appropriate to rebuff threatening actions taken by American and transatlantic adversaries. The words would fit the moment in condemning Iranian missile barrages against Israel or Russian atrocities in Ukraine or Chinese meddling in the U.S.
Unfortunately, the remark was made by Lithuanian Prime Minister-designate Gintautas Paluckas to characterize his nation’s courageous support for democratic Taiwan in the face of enormous pressure from Communist China to capitulate.
On Oct. 28, Lithuania’s “progressive” opposition parties defeated the ruling center-right government in the second round of parliamentary elections.
Lithuania will remain a central NATO ally in maintaining deterrence against Russian provocations as the host of an Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group. But Paluckas’ recent comment undermines Lithuania’s commitment to countering China’s malign influence in Europe.
Indeed, a Lithuanian reversal on China, amid proven Chinese support for Russia in Ukraine and heightened tensions in the Indo-Pacific, would fly in the face of settled transatlantic strategy and risk straining relations with Washington.
This whole situation erupted globally in July 2021, when Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu announced that, with Lithuania’s permission, Taiwan would open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. The Chinese Communist Party angrily responded by yanking China’s diplomatic representation in Vilnius, kicking Lithuania’s diplomats out of Beijing, and banning all Lithuanian exports from entering China.
Bravely undeterred, the Lithuanian government declared in its July 2023 Indo-Pacific Strategy that “Lithuania proves that a country can withstand economic blackmail if it has built up societal resilience and has reliable partners.” In contrast to his country’s firm resolve in the face of Chinese blackmail, Lithuania’s prime minister-designate chose to describe these brave actions as a “grave diplomatic mistake” and urge mending fences with China.
These actions are a concerning reversal of clear-eyed national security policy that aligned Lithuanian action with broader transatlantic threat assessments.
At the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, an updated Strategic Concept was issued outlining the alliance’s approach to account for growing threats to peace and security. One of its largest shifts focused on China, noting that the communist regime’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.”
Additionally, the Strategic Concept noted how China’s growing strategic partnership with Russia—described by Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping as a no-limits partnership—reinforces this negative dynamic.
And this hasn’t changed. As far back as February 2023, open-source analysis revealed the extensive flows of Chinese dual use goods to support the Russian war machine. Arguing that these goods weren’t for military use strains credulity, however, when one considers that jamming technology was among the exported goods and that Baltic states have experienced a worrying rise in disrupted civilian flights due to the jamming of navigation systems.
Beyond these obvious harms, Lithuania already has overcome the Chinese Communist Party’s scurrilous pressure campaign. In the face of Chinese government attacks, Lithuania stood strong and received backing from its allies, including America, in support of its courage in standing up for Taiwan’s right to conduct diplomatic outreach without a veto by the Chinese Communist Party.
Yet now, after Lithuania stood for freedom and spearheaded a unified transatlantic posture against Chinese vengeance, its new government is backing down.
This is happening even as Russia continues its barbarous war in Ukraine backed by China, an open wound often highlighted in Lithuanian government statements.
And in the aftermath of President-elect Donald Trump’s resounding electoral victory Nov. 5 on the back of a fiercely critical stance toward the CCP, the new Lithuanian government is backing away from a strong defense of democracy and Taiwan.
Given the international context and Washington’s desire to counter China’s malign influence across the board, this shift will strain relations with Washington. As Trump and his appointees enter office in January, they are likely to reappraise allied actions concerning China and emphasize a united allied front against Beijing’s malign influence.
Ultimately, if Lithuania’s incoming government reverses course, as Paluckas’ remark indicates, it will cast significant doubt on the durability of transatlantic unity against the autocratic regimes targeting the West.